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SUPPRESSED PREMISES UNDERLYINqG THE
GLUECK CONTROVERSY
DIVORCE TREATMENT FROM ADJUDICATION!
THOMAS

D. ELioT

Like the "Hotchkiss Report" of 1912 on the Chicago Juvenile
Court, the Glueck report of 1933 on the work of the Boston Juvenile Court2 may prove its importance chiefly through the fundamental
questions it raises in regard to the functions and efficiency of this
-social invention, this Hindu Deity of court, clinic, detention, and
pr6bation. To the high reputation of Dr. William Healy and of
the Boston court, quite .as much as to the source of the report itself,
may be attributed the amount of discussion following the Glueck
study. As other studies are appearing from the same source (the
Harvard Crime Survey), further examination of certain underlying
assumptions and conclusions involved is still timely.
'The Chicago Court, once served by Dr. Healy, has,' in general,
trended down hill since the war period. The Boston Court (formerly
presided over by the late Judge Frederick 'Cabot) is said to have
been ill equipped or operated during the period of the data selected
for tl~e study but to have improved since.8
Interested persons might compare with some curiosity the claim
by judge Eastman that the Boston court "has not had the necessary
support and cooperation from other social agencies" and had "a
dearth of social re sources in the community with which to carry
out either the recommendations of the Clinic or his own decisions,"
with the passages in Healy's book' in which he attributes the apparently greater success in his Boston series to the relatively greater
variety and' cooperative efficiency of the Boston agencies.
The H ealy study just cited was a follow-up of clinic cases
from both the Chicago and Boston Courts. It was as disillusioning
-LProfessor
of Sociology in Northwestern University.
2
Glueck, Sheldon and Eleanor T., One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents, laryard University Press, 1934.
SChute, Charles L., "The Juvenile Court Challenged," Survey, April 1, 1934:
pp. 116-17. Also Harry L. Eastman, "1000 Delinquent Boys," Survey, June 1,
1934: pp. 199-200.
4Healy, William, Delinquents and Criminals: Their Making and Unmaking,
Macmillan, 1926: Chapter XIX. Cf. also Glueck, Sheldon and Eleanor T., "A
Reply," Mental Hygiene, October, 1934: p. 554.
[22]

SUPPRESSED PREMISES

for the supposedly efficient period of the Chicago court as is the
Glueck study for the Boston court. But the Healy report showed
results from the Boston situation which are hard to reconcile with
the findings of the Glueck report.. Of Healy's two Boston series,
21% and 25.75% showed "failure";5 of Glueck's Boston series,
88.2% showed "failure."8
The Gluecks' book, but especially the conclusions drawn by
.others from the book, naturally drew fire from those professionally
employed in the field.7 Other reviews and comments have appeared
in periodicals of. law and of mental hygiene.7 Let us briefly review
50p. cit., p. 253: based upon adult court appearance.
OBased upon. case studies followed up by field work. Dr. Richard Cabot
of Harvard went further than the Gluecks themselves in considering their
data conclusive evidence of failure ("One Thousand Delinquent Boys," Survey,
February 15, 1934: pp. 38-40): "(The authors) have done an exemplary
job. .

.

These two books . . . are the first and, so far as I know, the only

pieces of thorough investigation in this field."
7The following is an incomplete chronological list of replies and reviews:
1: Cabot, Richard C., "One Thousand Delinquent Boys," Survey, Feb. 15,
1934: pp. 38-40.
2. "A New Method Needed for Juvenile Reform," Literary Digest,
March 10, 1934: p. 19.
3. Healy, William, "One Thousand Delinquents," Survey, March 15, 1934:
p. 94.
4. Chute, Charles L., "The Juvenile Court Challenged," Survey, April 15,
1934: pp. 116-17.
5. Schoenberg, Philip, "1000 Delinquents," Survey, April 15, 1934:.
pp. 140-1.
6. Dow, Charles E., "Is There No Hope for Delinquent Youth?" The
Tree (Minneapolis Council of Social.Agencies), April, 1934.
7. Elkind, Harry, and Taylor, Maurice, "Juvenile Courts and Clinics,"
Monthly Bulletin (Massachusetts Society for Mental Hygiene), MayJune, 1934: pp. 1-3.
8. Sutherland, E. H. (Review), Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,
1 May-June, 1934; pp. 144-6.
9. Wechsler, Herbert (Revie~W), Columbia Law Review, June, 1934: pp.
1155-1159.
10. Eastman, Harry L., "1000 Delinquent Boys," Survey, June 15, 1934:
pp. 199-200.
11. Dressier, David, ibid.: pp. 200-1.
12. Stevenson, George S., ibid.: p. 201.
13. Cabot, Richard C. (Reply), ibid.: pp. 201-2.
14. Glueck, Sheldon, "A Thousand Juvenile Delinquents

....

"

Yearbook

(National Probation Association), 1934: pp. 63-65, 90-98.
15. Eastman, Harry L., "The Juvenile Court Today,' ibid.: pp. 76-89,

99-103.16. Recldss, Walter C. (Review), American Bar Association Journal,
July, 1934: pp. 418-19.
17. Glueck, Eleanor, "The Challenge of Juvenile Delinquency," abstracted
in Child Welfare Leagule of America Bulletin. September, 1934: pp. 1-3,
5-6.
18. Elkind, Harry, and Taylor, Maurice, "'One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents': A Critique," Mental Hygiene, October, 1934: pp. 531-52.
19. Glueck, Sheldon and Eleanor, ibid., "A Reply": pp. 553-75.
20. Hiller, Francis H., "1000 Juvenile Delinquents," Probation (National
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this material as a background for a more thorough-going analysis
of the agencies and functions concerned.
The following seem to be the main criticisms of what may be
called the Glueck-Cabot findings:
1. Methods of the .study are considered unsound because of.
a. Alleged unrepresentativeness of the sample-t for delinquents, for this court's work, for Boston, and for juvenile
courts in general.
b. Alleged failures or inadequacy in the utilization of "control" groups for comparison.
c. Alleged unsound basis for adjudging success or failure.
.d.Alleged unsound statistical techniques.
2. The conclusion that the court or clinic is a failure is not considered valid until both' are well equipped, thoroughly used,
and supported by other adequate agencies.
3. It is claimed that our opinions of an institution should be
based upon a comparison with other agencies which preceded
it; and with contemporary institutions, such as banks, which
are equally under criticism but without thought of abandon*ing them.
4. It is said that even 12% of success may justify an- agency,
* if, without the agency, the failures -are worse.
5. Recidivism is not considered a fair test of the quality of
treatment, any more than in -the work of medical agencies;

also the court and clinic render other valuable services, scientific, diagnostic, interpretive, ameliorative, preventive.

6. 1Pactice is said to have improved since the date of the
Probation Association), October, 1934: pp. 8-9.
21. Mullins, Claude (Review), Harvard Law Review, Dec'ember, 1934:
-.pp. 356-58.
22. Mohr, George J., "One Thousand Delinquents-A Psychiatrist's Comment," Mental Healih Bulletin (Illinois Mental Hygiene Society), Feb-

ruary, 1935: pp. 3-4.

23. Elkind, Harry, unpublished paper before the American Ortho-psychiatric
Association, February, 1935.
24. Michael, Jerome (Review), Yale Law Journal, March, 1935: pp. 908-13.
25. Eastman, Harry L., "The Juvenile Court-Its Purpose and Function,"
abstracted in Child Welfare League of America Bulletin, April, 1935:
pp. 3, 6-8.
26. Healy, William, Bronner, Augusta, and Shimberg, Myra, "The Close of
Another Chapter in Criminology," Mental Hygiene, April, 1935: pp. 208-22.
27. Massachusetts "Child Council, The Problem of Juvenile Delinquency
. . . (Pamphlet) N. D.
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Gluecks' data, and certain of the Boston group are virtually
called behind-the-times.
7. The study is said to have fallen short of certain original
objectives.
8. The authors are said to have' judged as a treatment agency
a clinic p~rforming an almost exclusively diagnostic function; or, results of treatment by a combination of agencies
performing distinct functions are said to have been used as
a basis for a judgment on each of them; whereas .the excelIence of one agency could be obscured in the end results by
the failure of another agency.
9. The soundness of attempts to predict individual success or
failure from statistical studies of symptoms-or pre-conditions
is challenged. Neither the predictive factors nor the. treatments are thought sufficiently standardizable.
1Q. The assumption that there are identifiable delinquent types,
or inherent peculiarities in the delinquent group, is attacked.8
11. On the other hand, the Gluecks are thought by others to be
too mild in view of their data: The Juvenile court is con8
1n his February review (pp. 39-40). Cabot announced a doctrine which
almost seems"to imply a regression to the concept of hereditary criminality.
He finds in the Glueck book confirmation of his "impressioh" that criminals assuch are very different in capacity from the rest of us. "Most of us go wrong
but can learn to do better. The criminal is the person who cannot be taught
better in spite of facing the deterrent experiences which would probably
straighten out many of the rest of us. Partly by nature . . . he has formed

a definite bias for criminal ways .

.

.

. -Whether

. . . we could change these

strong biases by any of the remedies yet in sight I do not know. These two
books of the Gluecks certainly make me doubt it" (p. 40). He reiterates a
similar argument in his June reply (p. 202, par. 2). Dr. Cabot's pessimism
seems to rest upon something almost like a belief in predestination. If, however, Cabot's impression is based upon his own definition as given above, the
question is begged and the conclusion is foregone without any evidence from
the Gluecks or anybody else!
Such environments would doubtless make the susceptible among "the rest
of us" become "different" in the way we dub "delinquent." But in his June
reply (p. 202, par. 2) Cabot further implies that a community environment
is not etiologically important unless it can be shown to be universally effective.
This seems self-evidently fallacious. The Gluecks themselves, and several of
their reviewer. aver that successful reform depends upon community reorganization and improved environmental conditions. Cabot claims that tuberculosis
and rickets ltave been effectively combatted medically without radically changing community conditions; yet these are the very diseases in which a return
of the patient to the old social environment produces "recidivism."
To answer these points thoroughly would require a course in social logic,
from the theory of social causation through the concept of "sequence of
total situations" to Thomas' and Zaniecki's "Methodological Note"! They are
aside from the main argument of this paper which has to do with agencies and
their functions, but the writer could not let them pass unchallenged.
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sidered no better than a criminal court, if it has no better
results; the clinic's prognoses are weak and cases handled on
its recommendations are no better than without it; custodial
care should be increased.
Aside from these points the excellencies of the book and its
sponsors are recognized."
Cabot and the Gluecks have replied to those who defend the
court or attack their report. Answering Chute and others, Cabot9
gives his evidence that the Gluecks' data are soundly representative
for the court's work, and for other Boston courts. He sees no justification for court and clinic in mere fact-finding or interpretive
work; he quotes Healy on the failure of the court, but not his
point that the best physician cannot (indeed will not) guarantee
permanent cures. He insinuates that his critics are professionally
biased and again throws upon .them the burden of proving their
courts and clinics successful. His claim that there is no difference
in views between himself and the Gluecks is hard to reconcile with
the latter's later defenses. Perhaps, however, there is a difference
between the Gluecks' private views and their published conclusions,
the-latter being all they are publicly defending.
Mrs. Glueck replied to certain criticisms in a paper presented
at the Eastern Regional Conference of the Child Welfare League of
America in June.' 0 She agrees with most of he*r reviewers in attributing failures more to individual, home; and community situations than to shortcomings in treatment. (By way of analogy": if
cases unsuitable for X-ray treatment .are nevertheless given X-ray,
we can only criticize the prescription of X-ray for such cases, or
their acceptance by the laboratory; we cannot attack the competence
of the operators as such.) She does, however, claim with Cabot
that the cases studied were a typical sample; and that the court is
hampered in its legal and administrative equipment.
The Gluecks, in a moie or less successful attempt to answer the
elaborate critique by Elkind and Taylor,11 claim that'the latter misinterpret the objectives of the survey; that they ignore or belittle two
control studies which confirm certain conclusions of the Gluecks;
that skepticism rather than condemnation is their conclusion regarding clinic-courts in general;, that the favorable difference in results
9

See Note 7, No.'11, above.
SOSee Note 7, No. 14.
iSee Note 7, No. 16. Elkind and Taylor have also rebutted the above (see
Note 7, No. 17).
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when clinic recommendations were followed made unnecessary the
study of non-clinic groups; that further controls were impracticable,
unnecessary, or both; that 88.2% failure is significant even if the
district's non-court boys were proved 95% offenders during the same
period; that the "recidivism" was based on the same criteria as the
original court-intake; that prediction scores are not iproposed as
anything but supplementary guidance to agencies and case workers.
It is not the present writer's purpose to enter into the statistical
wrangle which seems to have developed over the Glueck reports.
TIere are certain elements in" the status quo which are apparently
taken for granted by both the Gluecks and their critics. It is these
elements which this paper seeks to bring again under the lens. An
unsound definition of the situation seems to be in danger of making
both groups of critics propose illogical programs.
The many-sided controversy has all been most interesting to one
who has for twenty years publicly advocated the superior effectiveness of case work in behavior problems when the treatment is carried on under non-court auspices. 1 2 For a generation the trend has
seemed to be distinctly in that direction. Dr. Cabot's characterization of the "Juvenile Court with a clinical adjunct" as "society's
most modem device for coping with juvenile delinquency"1 8 is
therefore surprising, unless in the scope of the word delinquency.
are included only such cases as have actually beeti declared delinquent by a juvenile court.
Says Dr. Cabot:
"Certainly one ideal juvenile court judge and two expert and widely
experienced psychiatrists with theirocorp§ of assistants cannot reform
juvenile delinquents with such bhckgrounds so long as diagnosis and treatment are in separate hands. These noble people, handicapped . . . with
this hopelessly unscientific and inefficient technique, are bound to fail
. . . until they cease to divorce responsibility for diagnosis from responsibility for treatment: '"
And again:
"Suppose.all the diagnostic and therapeutic influences concerned with
the delinquept boys were united under a single ministry of justice, so that
psychiatrists, independent probation officers, foster parents, heads of in12A partial list of the writer's publications on this point will be found at
the 18
close of this paper.
See Note 7, No. 11 p. 202.
14Cabot, Richard C., "1000 Delinquent Boys," Survey, February 15, 1934:
pp. 38-39. This is doubtless the passage which led the Literary Digest (See
Note 7, No. 2, above) to refer to "the ambitious scheme of juvenile reform in
Boston as "The Failure of a Noble Effort."
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stitutions, and parole boards all worked together under a common plan
and in view of the same state of facts about their boys . . . .15
To the writer, Cabot seems to be declaring a non-viable monster. that which is only a fissible Siamese twin which could function
better if, by their surgical separation, both pairs of feet could be
on the ground at the same time. The Gluecks, on
the other hankl,
propose to force the twin"to take on a triplet in the hope of getting
one fully integrated organism. The writer claims that the result
would be hydra-headed and web-footed.
The figure breaks down in this respect: the court and the probation office are not only not twins but are actually of different
species, the latter grafted upon the former. To change the metaphor,
the court should be referee of a game in which probation office and
clinic are two teammates. Teamwork would not improve by tying
the players to the umpire, or requiring the latter to carry the ball or
* even run the game. The juvenile court has unwarrantedly assumed
the role of coach or captain when it should be referee. Despite the
admitted incompatibility of essentially legalistic procedure and the
psychiatric social-work approach, Mrs. Glueck proposes their further
fusion:
"Clinic should be part of the court or very closely coordinated with
it (service branch and experimental branch). -Conflict in point of view
between judges and clinicians must be resolved.
"Integration not only of clinic and court, but also of these two with
the cominunity facilities for aiding in .treatment so that the treatment
8
process may be complete and unified.' 16
. In this respect, however, the Gluecks merely accept a program
frequently advanced or taken for granted by certain juvenile court
people. Glueck quoted with approval 7 statements from 'Chute, Abbott, Lou and others which give to the court as such the administration of treatment, cure, and prevention.
Thus Chute's argument
and the Gluecks' own argum ents all assume or accept the conventional
court-probation-clinic set-up and defend its continuance, on the ground
that it has never had a real chance to show what it could do.
Dr. Stevenson of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene
differs somewhat:

"The plea for complete rherging of the clinic and court is not, excepting in our larger cities where -specialization is- possible, conducive to the
close community coordination of schools, social and health agencies,...
l5Ibid.
."See Note 7, No. 15'7See Note 7, No. 13.
'sSee Note 7, No. 11.
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But (the writer would add) it is precisely in the larger cities that
differentiation of judicial from treatment agencies is most desirable
and most feasible. His statement is acceptable without his exception.
Healy's current views on this point are not so clear; he merely
says :"'

"Juvenile courts-in the main do not have adequate facilities for carrying out therapy that may reform delinquents."
"Should the Juvenile court be abolished?

....

We know . . . that

*it cannot be, at least now. But the bur'den of effort for the prevention and
cure of delinquency must be placed where it belongs. It is a community
affair."

I find myself in agreement with Judge Eastman of Cleveland
in the following extract. *
"When I say that the third function of the juvenile court is supervision, your sociologists will want to substitute or include the termtreatment. It is on this point that critics and authors confuse the facts
and try to hold the courts responsible for a function that belongs to the
commUnity and not to the courts. The treatment of delinquents requires
highly specialized services for which the court is not equipped and which
it cannot be expected to render. After having diagnosed the situation and
determined the treatment needed, it should obtain and supervise that treatment by whatever agencies in the community are best adapted to administer
it."

Sheldon Glueck, .on the contrary, made this comment:
"At one place in his paper Judge Eastman decries the attribution to
juvenile courts of the treatment function; at'another he includes among
the duties of a modem juvenile court the supervision of 'the social treatment of those delinquents whom it selects as most likely to profit by such
treatment.' I venture to suggest that the tecond is the sounder view." 2'
The writer ventures to suggest that the first is sounder!
Glueck apparently interprets Eastman as using "supervision"
and "treatment" synonymously. I had taken Eastman to mean merely
the issuing of orders, with such contacts with treatment agencies as
would assure the court that the agency to which the child is allocated
maintains the appropriate responsibility for its treatment.
Probation reviewed some of the reviews and arguments in its
October issee. Mr. Hiller there expresses the "hope that this discussion will continue and that it may result in a better understanding
of the proper functions of the juvenile court." The present writer's
continuation of the discussion is to the effect that an important cause
19See Note 7, No. 3.
2OSee Note 7, No. 14: p. 81.
21See Note 7, No. 13: p. 97.
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in the total situation is the lack of understanding by the National

Probation Association of the proper function of a juvenile courtqud Court.
iThe right of the court to exist has been defended by many of
its spokesmen, not on its own merits but on the merits (or demerits)
of the treatment machinery more or less tied up to it, but wrongly
identified with its essence. One is reminded of those theologians
who endanger public faith in the church by asserting that, if you
cannot accept this or that particular ritual or intellectual doctrine
you cannot be religious.
According to Mr. Hiller, the test of success should be a comparison of present with past agencies. There is truth in this; but
if that were the only test, we might claim the success of nineteenth
century bread pills, poultices, or anodynes, as compared with earlier
blkeding, prayer, or sympathetic magic in the treatment of septicemia.
If the present set-up has been proved largely palliative, such studies
as the Gluecks' should help us to discover and apply more efficient
combinations of our social resources.
It may be laid down as a useful principle that the limited effectiveness of a given agency for its desired purpose may be due,
not to any intrinsic flaws, but to some state of affairs which is external to the agency but is part of the total situation within which
the agency is expected to operate.
"
The writer wishes to defend the permanent value of the court,
not by virtue of clinic treatment or probation, but on its own grounds
as adjudicator. I have repeatedly urged that our thinking about the
courts as such be disentangled from our thinking about the various
kinds of treatments, processes, and treatment agencies which are not
of judicial character but are merely administered by courts. Certain
kinds of treatment of delinquents have never been under court administration (e. g., reformatories, placement by foster home societies).
Probation and/or treatment clinic seem to be under court operation
largely by historico-legal accident. From the writer's viewpoint there
is (except for local'circumstances) no more reason for attempting
to assay the combined efforts of court and treatment clinic than for
trying to measure the results of the combined efforts of court and
placement-agency, of court and attendance department, of court and
policewoman, or of any other selected treatment-agency, arbitrarily
paired with the judicial agency..
.
Here is the basic principle: The essential (i. e., the judicial)
functions of a couit are: to hear conflicting claims in cases where
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treatment cannot be settled on a non-court basis, and, if necessary,
to investigate the facts in such cases; then to make decisions and
issue orders to make them effective. But enforcing a decision is, in
matters of social treatment, not the same as carrying it out by means
of the court's own officers or with court equipment. In accordance .
with this principle a court order merely appropriately allocates or
transfers or confirms certain custodies and treatments by homes or
social agents.
So long as there remain otherwise-irreconcilable disputes between families and agencies as to the place or character of custody
and treatment of children, so long will juvenile courts (or better
yet, inclusive family courts) be useful and necessary in any childcaring system, to inivestigate and decide such cases. But such courts
should-directly employ not therapeutic practitionets but merely investigative and recording and enforcing-services.
For both administrative and social-psychological reasons the
valuable cas6-work functions now called probation- could probably
be carried on more effectively under public welfare auspices rather
than under direct court control. Many such cases might thus be
routed through to proper treatment without the conflict and stigma
inevitably involved in court procedure.
Court action implies or imputes compulsion in the orders for
treatment, even where compulsion may have been unnecessary. Even.
the legal fiction of compulsion may, elicit unfortunate responses in
a client or his group. Judicial process and compulsion (court orders)
should be reserved as last resort. Compulsory and non-court treatment would be administered by the agencies.
If we separated these two pha6es, adjudication and treatment, so
generally confused even by those supposedly closest to the problem,
the courts as such might avoid many of the attacks which have been
made upon them because of the present limitations and failures of
probationary treatment and because of the identification of the court
proper therewith.
When we confuse the judicial with the social-treatment phases
of this institutional hybrid, we get such garbling statements as that
"The Juvenile Court was established as a humanitarian adventure;
the hope of its being curative has not been fulfilled";23 or, that "if
such institutions as the Juvenile Court . .
do not cure or ameliorate delinquency, it is not obvious why they should exist"; 24 or, "In
221 refer not to probation as the mere legal status, but to the social process
of probation.
28
H1eafy, William, op. cit.
2
dCabot, Richard C., "1000 Delinquent Boys," Survey, June, 1934: p. 202.
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many progressive communities the Juvenile Court has taken on the
functions of a social service agency";2r5 or, "Our major objective is
to make it possible for Juvenile Courts to improve their case-work,"
or "Greater integration between the work of the judge, the probation
officers and the clinic, with the suggestion that the clinic should be
26
incorporated into the court and assist in treatment."
If we could free the courts from being identified with any particular kind of treatment-work (which may or may not prove effective
in the long run), the courts would be on safer and saner ground,
and all voluntary diagnosis and actual social treatment of behavior
problems could be more efficiently coordinated under educational
and welfare auspices, private and/or public.
If a clinic were "merged" with the court, it should not (as procarry on treatment. A strictly court clinic
posed by, the Gluecks)
should not try to do non-court work. It should be diagnostic (factfinding) only. It might check uap any facts in dispute, and provide
advice to the court in subsequent crises and rehearings. In all smaller
cities, a non-court clinic can serve these court functions equally well
when called upon; while if it were part of the court its non-court
work would be thusly handicapped.
. The Gluecks' shortcoming, as above suggested, seems to be this:
They take for granted the hybrid nature of the present court-probation
unit. They see that the court needs psy'chiatric diagnostic work
which should be integrated with it. Therefore they advocate attaching
a clinic to the court, but for treatmet purposes as well as for diagnosis. (They seem to recognize that consistency would similarly
put under the court the child-placing and other special treatment-services of the child-caring system also; they merely note that this would
be impractical!)
Integration of treatment agencies is desirable; but it would be
simpler to integrate probation (as a social-case-work process) with
the non-court clinics and thence wsith all other non-court. treatment
agencies, than to jerk the treatment clinic out of its present and increasingly .well-integrated status in the non-coiart child-caring system,
a move which would publicly confuse clinical service with judicial
compulsions, even as probation 27 is already so confused.
If present child guidance clinics were turned over to the courts,
it would become at once urgent to set- up a new set of non-court
guidance clinics, free from the stigma of court auspices.
2

5Eastman, Harry L, op. cit.: p. 200.
26Chute, C. L., "The Juvenile Court- Challenged," Survey, April 15, 1924:
p. 117.
2
7Glueck, op. cit., pp. 258-9.

SUPPRESSED PREMISES

For these reasons the writer feels, with Dr. Stevenson, 2 that
(while a court should have access to competent fact-finding and diagnostic personnel) the merging of court and treatment-clinic would be
a regression from the forward step made several years ago by the,
second of the Commonwealth Fund demonstration clinics, and since
followed in nation-wide child-guidance policies. For preventive purposes child-guidance treatment is far more accessible and more widely
.sought by non-court agencies and families, when it is not put under
court auspices.
.. Coordination of preventive and treatment services under noncourt administration, with the backing of a competent court with
family jurisdiction is the ideal set-up. It is to be hoped that the actual
trend in this direction so often pointed out, may be encouraged
wherever proposed changes in administration, legislation, or architecture are under consideration. Such -a court should have ample
jurisdiction for both "mild" and "tough" situations, but should be
used when court sanction is required for protection or enforcement.
Family courts should also be given the power of injunction against
persons and, places responsible for conditions imminently causing
delinquency.
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